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TRANQUILLA VAl, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BANK OF 
AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS AS-
SOCIATION, as Coexecutor and Trustee, etc., et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
[1] Husband and Wife-Community Property-Management and 
Control.-Because of his management and control over the 
community property, the husband occupies the position of 
trustee for his wife in respect to her half interest in the com-
llIunity assets; this position of trust is not terminated as to 
assets remaining in his hands when the spouses separate. It 
is part of his fiduciary duties to account to her for the com-
munity property when the spouses are negotiating a property 
settlement agreement. 
£2] Id.-Community Property-Management and Control.-Divorce 
proceedings do not in themselves interrupt the husband's 
powers with respect to management and control of communit.y 
property, since the effect of such proceedings is not to take 
the property into the court's custody. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property, § 64; Am.Jur., Hus-
band and Wife, § 50. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4, 5, 7, 11, 16] Husband and Wife, 
§ 100; [2, 3] Husband and Wife, § 101; [6, 8-10] Trusts, § 10; 
[12-14] Partnership, § 36; [15] Partnership, § 37: [17] Husband 
and Wife, §l65; [18, 21] Husband and Wife, § 189(3); [19, 20] 
Limitation of Actions, § 61(0); [22] Husband and Wife, § 189(2). 
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[3] Id.-Oommunity Property-Management and OontroL-When 
a divorce is pending, the power of a husband over the com-
munity property erists until entry of a flnal decree. 
r 4] Id.-Oommunity Property-Management and Oontrol.-Since a 
husband's eontrol of the community property continues until 
there has been a division of it by agreement or court decree, 
. the husband would remain a fiduciary in respect to his wife's 
interest in the community assets until such division was made, 
though she may choose not to rely on her husband and release 
him from his fiduciary duties. 
[5] Id.-Oommunity Property-Management and Oontrol.-The 
fiduciary relationship based on the husballd's position of 
trustee for his wife in respect to her interest in community 
property arises by virtue of the community property system 
which gives the husband management and control of such prop-
erty in order that the assets be more efficiently handled, and 
exists only as to the community property over which he has 
control. It should be distinguished from the confidential re-
lationship which is presumed to exist between spouses. 
r6] Trusts-Existence of Confidential Relationship.-A confidential 
relation exists between two persons when one has gained the 
confidence of the other and purports to act or advise with the 
other's interest in mind. It may exist although there is DO 
fiduciary relation; it is particularly likely to exist where there 
is a family relationship or one of friendship or such a relation 
of confidence as that which arises between physician and 
patient or priest and penitent. 
r7] Husband and Wife-Oommunity Property-Management aDd 
ControL-The confidential relationship and obligations arising 
out of the relation of husband and wife are dependent on the 
existence of confidence and trust, but the husband's fiduciary 
duties in respect to his wife's interest in the community prop-
erty continue as long as his control of that property continues, 
notwithstanding complete nbsence of confidence and trust and 
consequent termination of the confidential rJlationsbip. 
[8] '!'rusts - Oonfidential Relationship - Fiducial')' Relationship 
Distinguished.-The prerequisite of a confidential relationship 
is the reposing of trust and confidence by one person in another 
who is cognizant of this fact. The key factor in the existence 
of a fiduciary relationship lies in control by a person over the 
property of another. 
[9] Id.-Existence of Confidential and Fiducial')' RelatioDships.-·· 
While confidential and fiduciary relationships may exist simul-
timeously, they do not necessarily do so. 
[10] Id.-Existence of Confidential and Fiduciary Relationships.-
Though a confidential relationship may be terminated by either 
party, if an individual continues to control property of the 
) 
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other he is held to the duties of a fiduciary as long ae he retains 
such control, notwithstanding termination of the confidential 
relationship. 
flla, lIb] Husband and Wife - Community Property - Manage-
ment and ControI.-The position of a husband, in whom the 
management and control of the entire community estate is 
vested by Civ. Code, §§ 161a, 172, 172a, is frequently ana-
logized to that of a partner, agent or fiduciary. The fiduciary 
duties and rules governing their performance by a husband 
should be no fewer or less rigorous than those imposed on busi-
ness partners. 
[12] Partnership-Relations Between Partners-Fiduciary Rela-
tion.-In all proceedings connected with the conduct of a part-
nership every partner is bound to act in the highest good 
faith to his copartner anI! mny not obtain any advantage over 
him in the p:U'tnel'ship affairs by the slightest misrepresenta-
tion, concealment, threat or adverse pressure of any kind. (Civ. 
Cou<', ~§ 2410, 2411.) 
[13] ld. - Relations Between Partners - Fiduciary Relation. - In 
view of the nature of the relation, the necessity of exercising 
the highest good faith in it is especially marked between a man-
aging partner and his copartners, and proof that one has 
waived his rights against the other must be clear. 
[14] ld. - Relations Between Partners - Fiduciary Relation. - In 
the course of negotiations for dissolution, each partner must 
deal fairly with his copartners and not conceal from them 
important matters within his own knowledge touching the busi-
ness and property of the partnership. 
[15] ld.-Relations Between Partners-Fiduciary Belation.-One 
partner, in negotiating for the purchase of his copartner's in-
terest in the partnership, owes the latter the duty of fair play 
and full disclosure, but once the sale is consummated, the 
relationship between them immediately ceases and the pur-
chaser is justified in dealing thereafter with the other at 
arm's length. 
[16] Husband and Wife-Community Property-Management and 
Control.-The fact that a wife employs able counsel on whom 
she relies in negotiating a property settlement agreement in 
conjunction with her action for separate maintenance does not 
release the husband from any fiduciary duties in respect to her 
interest in the community property. 
[17] ld. - Transactions Inter Se - Fraud. - A husband's failure, 
while negotiating a property settlement agreement with his 
[17] See Cal.Jur.2d, Husband and Wife, §§ 64, 77; Am.Jur., 
Husbano a11(1 Wife, § 184. 
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wife pending her action for separate maintenance, to disclose 
fully and fairly material facts relating to the value of com-
munity assets, from which he gained an advantage, constituted 
a concealment of material facts and a breach of fiduciary duty 
with respect to his wife's interest in the community property 
Under his control and management. This was constnletive 
fraud, whether or not such failure to disclose was accompanied 
by actual intent to defraud. (Civ. Code, §§ 2235, 1573, subds. 
1,2.) 
nS] Id.-Actions-Defenses-Laches.-In an action to rescind a 
property settlement agreement on the ground of fraud, in 
determining whether there was unreasonable delay in com-
mencing the action, the proper guide was the statute of limita-
tions stating that an action for relief on the ground of fraud 
must be commenced within three years, but that the cause 
of action is not deemed to have accrued until discovery, by 
the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud. (Code 
Civ. Proe., § 338, subd. 4.) 
[19] Limitation of Actions - Fraud - Discovery - Knowledge of 
Facts.-Discovery is different from knowledge, so that where 
a party defrauded has received information of facts which 
should put him on inquiry and the inquiry, if made, would 
disclose the fraud, he will be charged with discovery as of 
the time the inquiry would have given him knowledge •. 
[20] Id.-Fraud-Discovery-Knowledge of Facts.-In order that 
means of knowledge shall charge plaintiff or the party de-
frauded with knowledge or notice, the circumstances must be 
such that inquiry becomes a duty and failure to make it a neg-
ligent omission; when no duty is imposed by law to make in-
quiry and where under the circumstances a prudent man would 
not be put on inquiry, the mere fact that means of knowledge 
are open to plaintiff and he has not availed himself of them 
does not debar him from relief when thereafter he shall make 
actual discovery. 
[21] Husband and Wife - Actions - Defenses - Laches. - In an 
action by a widow to rescind a property settlement agreement 
on the ground of fraud, assuming that plaintiff, who did not 
actually know of the fraud before her husband's death, could 
have discovered the fraud had she investigated, where no cir-
cumstances were shown which should have put plaintiff on in-
quiry until after her husband's death when she was told that 
she had not been treated fairly by her husband, there was no 
unreasonahlc delny in instituting the action shortly after his 
death, though it was instituted more than three years after 
the agreement was signed. 
[19] See Oal.Jur.2d, I,imitation of Actions, § 55; Am.Jur., Limi-
tation of Actions, § 169. . 
'I 
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[22] Id.-Actions-Defenses-Estoppel.-In an action by a widow 
to rescind a property settlement agreement, plaintifi' was not 
estopped and precluded from rescission by a stipulation in the 
agreement that it was entered into freely and voluntarily 
without promises or representations not contained therein, 
where none of its provisions had any legal or binding effect 
because the agreement itself was procured by fraud. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. William J. Palmer, Judge. Reversed. 
Action by a widow to rescind a property settlement agree-
ment on ground of deceased husband's fraud, and for recovery 
of part of property received by husband or for damages. 
Judgment for defendants reversed. 
Martin & Camusi, William P. Camusi and Kenneth D. 
Holland for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Appel, Liebermann & Leonard and Boekel, Moran & Morris 
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
George M. Breslin, Michael G. Luddy, Henry G. Bodkin, Jr., 
E. E. Hitchcock, Cosgrove, Cramer, Diether & Rindge, Samuel 
H. Rindge, Wallace & Wallace, W. Woodson Wallace and 
Alden Reid for Defendants and Respondents. 
WHITE, J.-This is an appeal by Tranqnilla Vai from a 
judgment for defendant Bank ofA.merica as coexecutor with 
Henry Bodkin of the estate of Giovanni Vai, deceased, in a 
suit brought to rescind a property settlement agreement on 
the ground of fraud, for recovery of part of the property 
received by the hnsband under the agreement, and for damages 
in the event recovery thereof cannot be had. 
Plaintiff and Giovanni (John) Vai were married in Italy 
in 1907 and emigrated to this conntry and Los Angeles in 
1912. John joined his brother James in operating a winery. 
He remained in this business and related operations continu-
ously from 1912 until his death in February 1957, and plain-
tiff actively assisted him until their only child Madeline was 
born in 1925. Their daughter is mentally arrested and has 
required constant care and attention. Apparently the rela-
tions between plaintiff and her husband had been something 
less than harmonious for several years before January 1953, 
) 
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when she left their home in Alta Loma and moved to another 
residence they owned in Parkside, where she has since resided. 
She consulted with counsel, Mr. Hallam Mathews, on Janu-
. ary 7, 1953. After plaintiff gave him a list of the property in 
which she believed John had an interest, Mr. Mathews secured 
a Dun and Bradstreet report on Padre Vineyard Company, 
owned jointly by John and his brother, and a combined report 
on Cucamonga Valley Winc Company and Rancho El Camino, 
John's individual businesses. Mr. Mathews also secured de-
scriptions of real property in San Bernardino County and a 
description of the Parkside property, consisting of a 30-year-
old residence with 15 apartments. 
On February 6, 1953, plaintiff filed a separate maintenance 
action, and John was served with a "Subpoena In Re Deposi-
tion and Order to Show Cause for Support, etc. Pendente 
Lite." John and his attorney represented, and the trial court 
so found, that John's health was such that adversary pro-
ceedings would be highly detrimental; that it would not be 
necessary for Mr. Mathews to pursue his legal remedies of 
discovery; that plaintiff would be voluntarily supplied with 
full and complete information; and that John would negotiate 
a fair and equitable property settlement agreemcnt. No 
further independent investigation was made by plaintiff 
except for an appraisal of the Parkside property which she 
was to receive in the property settlement agreement. Follow-
ing execution of this agreement, on March 16, 1953, the action 
for separate maintenance was abandoned. The present. action 
was instituted shortly after John's death. 
The property settlement agreement provided that plaintiff 
should have one-half of any property later discovered to 
have been inadvertently omitted from the list of community 
assets. Pursuant to this clause, the trial court awarded her a 
total of $84,000 as her share of the following items of "after-
discovered" property: 95 shares of common stock of the Bank 
of America, together with all dividends paid thereon sinee 
March 16, 1953, amount.ing to $897.75; a promissory note in 
the principal sum of $33,640 with $1,462.55 interest; an ac-
count payable to Giovanni Yai. from Paclre Vineyard Com-
pany, in the sum of $23,000; the balance owing on a promis-
sory note of Padre Vineyard Company in favor of Giovanni 
Vai in the sum of $25,630.44; the balance owing on two notes 
of Padre Vineyard Company to Giovanni Vai, doing business 
as the Cucamonga Valley Wine Company in the sum of 
$42,315.38. 
) 
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The trial court found that the net worth of John and 
Tranquilla Vai at the time of the settlement was $1,270,000, 
not including one-half the shares of Padre, net book value of 
which was $800,000. All of the property was conceded by the 
parties to be community. There were debts for which the 
community was liable of $85,000. In the settlement, plaintiff 
received the Parkside property, valued at $150,000, $25,000 in 
cash, a Dodge automobile, $1,204 balance in an account ill 
the Bank of America, and half of the Italian lire on deposit 
in Italy (about $1,000). She was released from any obligation 
to support the daughter, Madeline, and from any possible lia-
bility as coguarantor with her husband on a note securing a 
debt from Padre Vineyards to the Bank of America. Although 
she waived alimony, she was guaranteed a net income of $500 
per month from Parkside, which defendant agreed to keep in 
repair as long as she owned it. John received the balance 
of the property which was, it now appears, valued at least at 
$1,500,000. 
The complaint initiating this suit to rescind the property 
settlement agreement charged that in the negotiation of the 
property settlement, John Vai was guilty of actual fraud, con-
sisting of allegedly false representations and intentional con-
cealment of material facts, by which the plaintiff was deceived 
and defrauded. It also charged constructive fraud, consisting 
of breach of John Vai's duty as a fiduciary to make a free 
and full disclosure of all important and relevant facts. The 
trial court ruled that John was not a fiduciary, that the parties 
dealt at arm's lenuth, that there was no iss'lle of constructive 
fraud and that there. was no proof of actual fraud. 
Plaintiff contends that although the confidential relation-
ship between herself and her husband, based on her confidence 
and trust in him, may have been terminated by her filing suit 
for separate maintenance, her husband remained in a fiduciary 
position in respect to her interest in the community property. 
He breached his fiduciary duty, she asserts, by concealing 
material facts and by falsely representing others. 
Defendants l'ontend that Collim v. Collins, 48 Ca1.2d 325 
[309 P.2d 420], is directly applicable to the facts at bar as 
found by the trial court. In Collins, the wife sought recision 
of a property settlement agreement on the ground that her 
husband had concealed community property assets from her 
and thus breached his duty of full disclosure arising out of the 




336 V AI 1). BANE: OF AMERICA [56 C.2d 
had gone to establish residence for divorce, requested the 
defendant husband to furnish them with a full and accurate 
list of community property. This request was never complied 
with. Mrs. Collins returned to California and signed an agree-
ment prepared by defendant's attorney, and against the advice 
of her own counsel. Some properties standing in defendant's 
. llame were not listed ill the agreement, but no attempt had 
been made by the defendant to conceal these properties which 
he claimed to be his separate property, or to hinder in any 
wayan investigation begun by Mrs. Collins and her attorney. 
Manifestly, Mrs. Collins was fully aware that her husband 
had not disclosed any information about their community 
property, and expressly waived any such disclosure in writing 
when she executed the agreement. She knowingly chose to 
deal at arm's length and to rely on her own investigation of 
community assets. Thus by her own act, Mrs. Collins termi-
nated the fiduciary relationship in respect to her interest in 
the community property and the attendant duty to disclose. 
Plaintiff in the instant case discontinued the adversary pro-
ceedings commenced by her at the request of the defendant 
who offered to supply full and complete information concern- . 
ing the property all of which was conceded to be community, 
and who further stated that he was willing to negotiate a 
fair and equitable property settlement. It would seem that 
plaintiff chose not to terminate the fiduciary relationship nor 
to deal at arm's length, but instead to take the defendant'a 
offer at face value. She signed the agreement believing that 
she was fully and accurately informed as to the Vai community 
financial position. 
Manifestly, therefore, the facts in Collins, supra, are 
markedly dissimilar from those in the instant case except 
insofar as both wives were represented by counsel who com-
menced investigations. 
Section 161a (Civ. Code) provides: "The respective inter-
ests of the husband and wife in community property during 
continuance of the marriage relation are present, existing and 
equal interests under the management and controi of the 
husband as is provided in sections 172 and 172a .... This 
section shall be construed as defining the respective interests 
and rights of husband and wife in the community property."1 
'Civil Code, t 172: "The husband has the management and control 
of the community personal property. • . ." Civil Code, t 172a: "The 
husband has the management and control of the community real prop-
erty .••• " 
) 
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[1] Because of his management and control over the com-
munity property, the husband occupies the position of trustee 
for his wife in respect to her one-half interest in the com-
munityassets. (Fields v. Michael, 91 Cal.App.2d 443, 447-448 
l~05 P.2d 402].) Recognizing this principle, Justice Traynor, 
speaking for a unanimous court, stated in Jorgensen v. Jorgen-
sen, 32 Cal.2d 13, 21 [193 P.2d 728], "As the manager of the 
community property the husband occupies a position of trust 
(Civ. Code, §§ 172-173, 158), which is not terminated as to 
assets remaining in his hands when the spouses separate. It 
is part of his fiduciary duties to account to the wife for the 
community property when the spouses are negotiating a prop-
erty settlement agreement." 
[2] "Even divorce proceedings pending do not, in them-
selves, interrupt the husband 's powers with respect to the 
management and control of community property, as the e1feet 
of such proceedings is not to take the property into the cus-
tody of the court. The husband continues to have control of 
it and full power to dispose of it." (Chance v. Kobsted, 66 
Cal.App. 434, 437 [226 P. 632].) [3] "When a divorce is 
pending the power of a husband over the community property 
exists until the entry of a final decree. (Lord v. Hough, 43 
Cal. 581; Chance v. Kobsied, 66 Cal.App. 434, 437 [226 P. 
632] ; In re Cummings, 84 F.Supp. 65, 69.)" (Harrold v. 
Harrold,43 Cal.2d 77, 81 [271 P.2d 489].) 
[ 4] Since the husband's control of the community prop-
erty continues until there has been a division of it by agree-
ment or by court decree, it would follow that the husband 
would continue to remain a fiduciary in respect to his wife's 
interest in the community assets until such division was made. 
Of course, as wa.c; the case in Collins v. Collins, 48 Cal.2d 325 
[309 P.2d 420], the wife may choose not to rely on her husband 
and release him from the performance of his fiduciary duties. 
[ 15 ] This fiduciary rellltionship arises by virtue of the 
community property system which gives the husband manage-
ment and control of such property in order that the assets be 
more efficiently handled, and exists only as to the community 
property over which the husband has control. It should be 
distinguished from the confidential relationship which is pre-
sumed to exist behveen spouses. [6] "A confidential rela-
tion exists between two persons when one has gained the con-
fidence of the other and purports to act or advise with the 
other's interest in mind. A confidential relation may exist 
') 
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although there is no fiduciary relation; it is particularly likely 
to exist where there is a family relationship or one of friend-
ship or such a relation of confidence as that which arises be-
tween physician and patient or priest and penitent." (Rest., 
Trusts 2d, § 2, comment b.) 
[7] The confidential relationship and obligations arising 
, out of it are, therefore, dependent upon the existence of con-
fidence and trust, but the husband's fiduciary duties in re-
spect to his wife's interest in the community property con-
tinue as long as his control of that property continues, not-
withstanding the complete absence of confidence and trust, 
and the consequent termination of the confidential relationship. 
[8] The prercquisite of a confidential relationship is the 
reposing of trust and confidence by one person in another who 
is cognizant of this fact. The key factor in the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship lies in control by a person over the 
property of another. [9] It is evident that while these two 
relationships may exist simultaneously, they do not necessarily 
do so. For example, in Estate of Cover~ 188 Cal. 133 [204 
P. 583], where all of the property under the husband's control 
was his separate property, only a confidential relation existed. 
As this court there pointed out at page 144, the husband in 
contracting with his wife concerning his separate property, 
may choose either to advise his wife with her welfare in mind 
or to "deal with her at arm's length and as he would with a 
stranger, all the while giving her the opportunity of inde-
pendent advice as to her rights in the premises." 
The simultaneous existence of a confidential 'relationship 
based on trust and confidence and a fiduciary relationship 
arising out of control of property of another is readily ap-
parent in many common associations-principal and agent, 
attorney and client, business partners, to name a few. [10] It 
is evident that although the confidential relationship may be 
terminated by either party, if an individual continues to 
control property of the other he is held to the duties of a 
fiduciary as long as he retains such control, notwithstanding 
the termination of the confidential relationship. 
[11&] As noted ill Fields v. Miclia,cl, S11pra (91 Cal.App.2d 
443,447), "The position of the husband, in whom the manage-
ment and control of the entire community estate is vested by 
statute (Civ. Code, §§ 161a, 172, 172a), has been frequently 
analogized to that of a partner, agent or fiduciary. (Estate 
of McNutt, 36 Cal.App.2d 542, 552 [98 P.2d 253] ; GroZemuM 
v. Cafferata, 17 Ca1.2d 679, 684 [111 P.2d 641]; LyMm v. 
) 
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Vorwerk, 13 Cal.App. 507, 509 [110 P. 355]; 1 de Funiak, 
Principles of Community Property, § 95, p. 263.)" 
The dissolution of a partnership and attendant agree-
. ments respecting partnership property appear to be re-
markably similar to the dissolution of the conjugal relation 
. and property settlement agreements. [12] Briefly, "in 
an proceedings connected with the conduct of the partnership 
every partner is bound to act in the highest good faith to his 
copartner and may not obtain any advantage over him in the 
partnership affairs by the slightest misrepresentation, con-
cealment, threat or adverse pressure of any kind {Civ. Code, 
§§2410,2411)." (Llewelyn v. Levi, 157 Cal. 31, 37 [106 
P. 219], quoted in Yeomans v. Lysfjord, 162 Cal.App.2d 357, 
361-362 [327 P.2d 957], and Prince v. Harting, 177 Cal.App.2d 
720, 727 [2 Ca1.Rptr. 545].) [13] In view of the nature 
of the relation, the necessity of exercising the highest good 
faith in it is especially marked between a managing partner 
and his copartners, and proof that one has waived his rights 
against the other must be clear. (Lal/an v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 662, 
679 [70 Am.Dec. 678], Burrow v. Carley, 210 Cal. 95, 105 
[290 P. 577].) [14] In the course of negotiations for disso-
lution, each partner must deal fairly with his copartners and 
not conceal from them import.ant matters within his own knowl-
edge touching the business and property of the partnership. 
(Arnold v. Arnold, 137 Cal. 291,296 [70 P. 23].) [15] Thus, 
one partner, in negotiating for the purchase of his copartner's 
interest in the partnership owes the latter the duty of fair 
play and full disclosure, but. once the sale is consummated, the 
relationship between them immediately ceases and the pur-
chaser is justified in dealing thereafter with the other at 
arm's length. (Wise &alty Co. v. Stewart, 169 Cal. 176 [146 
P. 534]; 120 A..L.R. 724.) 
[11 b] Manifestly, the fiduciary duties and rules governing 
their performance by a husband should be no fewer or less 
rigorous than those imposed upon business partners. [16] To 
hold, as defendant urges, that if a wife employs able counsel 
upon whom she relies in negotiating a property settlement 
agreement ·in conjunction with her action for separate mainte-
nance, that her husband is thereby released from any fiduciary 
duties in respect to her interest in the community property, 
would put a wife in a far less protected position than a 
partner whose partnership is being dissolved. It would 
U permit the authority of the husband in controlling the com-
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munity property, given him in the interest of greater freedom 
in its use and for its transfer for the benefit of both himself 
and his wife, to become a weapon to be used by him to rob her 
of every vestige of interest in the community property with 
which the law has expressly invested her. Such a conclusion 
would violate every sense of justice, and outrage every prin-
ciple of fair dealing known to the law." (Provost v. Provost, 
102 Cal.App. 775, 781 [283 P. 842].) 
Plaintiff alleges that due to misrepresentations and con-
cealments by the defendant, she was not informed as to 
the actual value of the community property and that she 
would not have executed the property settlement agreement 
in question had she been accurately and fully informed. 
Specifically, plaintiff contends that the value of Rancho El 
Camino was misrepresented and concealed. The following find-
ings in respect to Rancho El Camino were made by the trial 
court. :Mr. :Mathews, plaintiff's counsel, was shown a financial 
statement prepared by John showing the book value of the 
vineyard land at Rancho EI Camino to be $200 per acre. 
Plaintiff '5 counsel was told of other vineyard land which sold 
for $400 to $450 an acre but that such land was closer to 
factories. He was not told of the price received by John ($566 
per acre) for vineyard land immediately to the north o!' 
Rancho EI Camino sold nine months previously. The trial 
court found that Mr. Mathews (plaintiff's attorney) was 
told that Rancho EI Camino was of little market value as a 
vineyard and could hardly be sold when the wine market was 
depressed. However, on February 21, 1953, 23 days prior to 
the execution of the property settlement agreement, Jolm Vai 
executed a sale deposit receipt for $25,000 with Donald Dun-
can, for the sale of Rancho El Camino, at a price of $525,000, 
or $814 an acre. Plaintiff was never informed of this fact. 
Escrow was opened four days after execution of the property 
settlement agreement with plaintiff, and the property duly 
sold to Duncan. 
As additional breaches of John's fiduciary duty, plaintiff 
draws our attention to representations relating to the financial 
condition of Padre Vineyard which were made by John to 
his wife and her attorney. When consideration is given to 
representations found by the trial court to have been made to 
plaintiff and comparison is had with other findings as to the 
verity of such representations, it is readily apparent that 
many representations were either not true or at least only 
partially true. For instance, to cite a few: (1) Representation: 
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Little would be realized if Padre were liquidated. Finding: 
Padre's assets at the time of the execution of the property 
settlement agreement exceeded its liabilities by approJOimately 
one milliou dollars; it's net book value was in excess of 
$800,000. (2) Representation: Padre was in danger of in-
solvency. Finding: It was not in danger of immediate in-
solvency, but if its operations continued to lose mOl1('y as it 
llad ill the past, R danger of insolvency existed. (3) Repre-
sentation: Salaries due to John and his brother as officers of 
Padre had not been paid. Finding: Salaries of $300 to $500 
a month had been and were currently being paid. (4) Repre-
sentation: Padre owed John $80,000 to $90,000 and could not 
meet its obligations. Finding: Various payments, including 
$2,500 per month, on indebtedness owing to John had been 
made by Padre during the months previous to the execution 
of the property settlement agreement. (5) Representation: 
A grave danger existed that Mrs. Vai and John would be 
held liable on a continuing guaranty of Padre's liabilities 
up to $300,000 to the Bank of America. Finding: The indebt-
edness to the Bank was secured by the hypothecation of assets 
worth $],320,729 including only a part of the wine inventory 
which could have been sold on the market for $435,000. 
A transaction which took place in September, 1954 is in-
dicative of the actual worth of John's one-half interest in this 
(Padre) company which was "in danger of insolvency." 
Padre orgRnized a new corporation called Padre Holding 
Company, and later Alta Lorna Development Corporation. 
John, in a split-off procedure, becRme the sole owner of this 
corporation in exchange for his Padre stock. At that time, 
the holding company had a net worth of $471,500 and no 
liabilities. By June 30, 1955, over $300,000 of its assct., were 
in cash. 
As heretofore stared, the trial court found that the 11et 
community worth at the time the agreement was signed was 
$1,270,000 exclusive of one half of the Padre stock which John 
and plaintiff owned. The net book value was $800,000. Roma 
Wine had offered to buy the Padre company for $850,000 
cash, assuming the liabilities, and as previously noted, John 
received stock valued at over $400,000 in the split-off procedure 
noted above. So, although the trial court felt. that the stock 
in Padre had no determinable fair market value, a valuation 
of $400,000 on the community interest in Padre as of March 
1953 would not bc excessive. This brings the net community 
worth up to $1,670,000. The trial court found that the obliga-
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tion undertaken by John in the property settlement agreement 
to support Madeline for the rest of her life .had a value as 
of March 16, 1953, of between $516,000 to $615,000. Even 
if this entire sum is deducted from the total community assets, 
.there remained over $1,000,000. It is obvious that the division 
of the marital property under the instant agreement is an 
inequitable one, and one to which neither plaintiff nor her 
attorney would, as they contend, have agreed had tbey been 
fully informed by John Vai as to the value of the community 
assets. 
Numerous other contentions relating to the existence of 
actual fraud are made by plaintiff, many of which appear to 
have merit. It docs not seem necessary to discuss them, how-
ever, in view of our holding contrary to that of the trial court 
that a husband is under a fiduciary duty with respect to his 
wife's interest in the community property.under his control 
and management. [17] The failure of the husband in the 
instant case to disclose fully and fairly material facts relat-
ing to the value of community assets from which John gained 
an advailtage constitutes a concealment of material facts and 
a breach of this fiduciary duty. This is constructive fraud, 
whether or not such failure to disclose was accompanied by an 
actual intent to defraud. (Civ. Code, §§ 2235, 1573, subds. 1 
and 2.) 
We are persuaded that the trial court misapplied the law 
and erred in holding that no fiduciary relationship existed 
during the negotiations leading up to the execution of the 
property settlement agreement. The facts as found by the 
trial court show the existence of a fiduciary relationship and 
constructive fraud as a matter of law. 
As to the failure of the now decedent husband to disclose 
fully and fairly and the concealment on his part of material 
facts with regard to the value of assets of the community, we 
are satisfied from a reading of the record that this deception 
was not only practiced upon the plaintiff wife but upon Mr. 
Vai's attorney, Henry G. Bodkin, Sr., as well. At the trial 
of the instant proceeding, the latter testified that at the time 
the property settlement agreement was negotiated, his client, 
Mr. Vai, did not advise Attorney Bodkin, Sr., nor did the 
latter have any knowledge of the" after-discovered" property 
hereinbefore referred to, the wife's share of which amounted 
to $84,000. Attorney Bodkin, Sr. further testified that at no 
time during the property settlement negotiations did his 
client, defendant husband, inform him that 23 days prior to 
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thc execution of the property settlement agreement, he had 
executed a sale deposit receipt for $25,000 for the sale of 
Rancho EI Camino, at a price of $525,000, or $814 an acre, 
instead of $200 per acre which Mr. Vai had represented to 
plaintiff· wife was the book value of the vineyard land at 
Rancho EI Camino. 
Defendants ·contend, however, that plaintiff is barred by 
laches and estoppel. The complaint in the instant action was 
not filed until March 18, 1957, although the agreement was 
signed by the parties on March 16, 1954. The trial court 
found that the plaintiff was told of the sale of Rancho EI 
Camino by John and by one of his employees in the "Spring" 
of 1954, and consequently is barred by the equitable doctrine 
of laches: an unreasonable delay in commencing the action 
which bas prejudiced the defendants. 
[18] To determine whether the delay has been an un-
'reasonable one, we are guided by the applicable statute of 
limitations for an action at law, in this case, Code of Civil 
Procedure section 338, subdivision 4: "An action for relief 
on the ground of fraud or mistake [must be commenced with-
in three years]. The cause of action in such case not to be 
deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved 
party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake." 
[19] There is no evidence in· the record that plaintiff 
actually knew of the fraud before the death of her husband. 
However, "discovery is different from knowledge, [so] that 
where a party defrauded has received information of facts 
which Should put him upon inquiry, and the inquiry if made 
would disclose the fraud, he will be charged with a discovery 
as of the time the inquiry would have given him knowledge." 
(Victor Oil Co. v. Drur", 184 Cal. 226, 240 [193 P. 243].) 
[a 0 ] "The circumstances must be such that the inquiry be-
comes a duty, and the failure to make it a negligent omis-
sion." (Tarke v. Bifl,g1uz.m, 123 Cal. 163, 166 [55 P. 759].) 
"Where no duty is imposed by law upon a person to make 
inquiry, and where under the circumstances 'a prudent 
man' would not be put upon inquiry, the mere fact that means 
of knowledge are open to a plainti1f, and he has not availed 
himself of them, does not debar him from relief when there-
after he shall make actual discovery." (MacDcmald v. Reick 
«<: Lievre, I'M., 100 Cal.App. 736, 740-741 [281 P. 106].) 
[a 1] Assuming that plaintiff could have discovered the 
fraud had she investigated, defendants have not pointed out 
) 
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any circumstances which should have put plaintiff upon in-
quiry until after John's death in 1957 when she was told that 
she had not been treated fairly by her husband. 
[22] Defendants argue that plaintiff is estopped and 
precluded from rescission by the stipulation in the agreement 
that it was entered into freely and voluntarily without prom-
ises or representations not contained therein, and the trial 
court so found. But, as plaintiff correctly points out, when 
the agreement itself is procured by fraud, none of its pro-
visions have any legal or binding effect. "This pro-
vision of the contract-even if we assume that, if valid, it 
could redound to the benefit of the Association-was not a 
waiver of plaintiffs' right to maintain the action. The fraud 
which was the inducing cause of the execution of the contract 
renders the whole instrument vulnerable-the clause in ques-
tion as well as all the other provisions. (Watson v. Duarte, 
62 Cal.App. 52 [215 P. 1039] ; American Natio'lUll Bank v. 
Sommerville, 191 Cal. 364 [216 P. 376].) ... 'No one 
can be estopped by anything contained in an instrument which 
instrument was itself obtained from him by fraud and de-
ceit.' (Hofflin v. Moss, 67 F. 440, 444 [14 C.C.A. 459].) 
The chain cannot be stronger than its weakest link. The 
clause which it is claimed estops plaintiff to complain of the 
fraud cannot be made to survive the rest of the transaction 
as a shield and protection to defendants, when false represen-
tations were the efficient and inducing cause of the contract." 
(Palladine v. Imperial Valley Farm Lands Assn., 65 Cal.App. 
727,747 [225 P. 291].) 
It is manifest from the foregoing that plaintiff is neither 
estopped nor barred by laches from seeking to rescind the 
property settlement agreement, and that she is entitled to 
the relief sought because of the constructive fraud of her 
husband. . 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., Dooling, J., and Fourt, J. pro 
tem.,· concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
I would affirm the judgment, for the findings of the trial 
court are supported by substantial evidence. 
In March 1953 plaintiff and her husband executed a prop-
* Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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erty settlement agreement dividing their community property. 
This agreement was not repudiated until plaintiff brought this 
action to rescind it shortly after Mr. Vai's death in 1957. His 
will provides that the major part of his property be placed in 
trust for the support of his and plaintiff's daughter, who is 
mentally arrested, and also for the support of plaintiff should 
she be in need and if sufficient assets are available. After the 
death of both the daughter and plaintiff the remainder is to go 
to certain charities. 
The community property of the spouses consisted of real 
estate, cash and securities of the value of $1,270,000 and a half 
interest in Padre corporation, a family-owned winery. Under 
the agreement plaintiff received apartment houses worth 
$150,000 and cash in the amount of $27,000. Her husband 
agreed to pay all taxes and maintenance costs of the apart-
ment houses for plaintiff's life and guaranteed her a net an-
llUal income after income taxes of $6,000. In 1953 a com-
mercial annuity equal to these two agreements would have cost 
at least $80,000.1 She will also receive $42,000 and 47% 
shares of Bank of America stock pursuant to the agreement to 
divide evenly all after-discovered community assets. The total 
of these items is over $300,000. 
Moreover plaintiff received an automobile, a release from a 
$300,000 continuing guaranty executed by her and her hus-
band to secure loans by the Bank of America to the Padre 
corporation and a release from a $75,000 guaranty for other 
debts. The trial court did not assign a dollar value to these 
items. The rest of the community property, and the Padre 
stock went to the husband. Plaintiff's husband also agreed, 
however, to pay all expenses for the support and care of their 
daughter. The trial court determined that the value of the 
obligation to provide for this care is between $515,000 and 
$615,000. 
After deducting for the care of the daughter and the 
obligations assumed by Mr. Vai, the division of the community 
property was therefore as follows: plaintiff received property 
and agreements of the value of over $300,000, an automobile 
and a release from liability for the loans of Padre and other 
community debts. The husband received property of the 
value of approximately $350,000 to $450,000 and the Padre 
stock. 
1This figure is based on an interpretation of the agreement least favor-
able to plnintiff. Under other interpretations it would be far greater. 
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This agreement was reached after negotiations in which 
the plaintiff was at all times represented by counsel of her 
own choice, and her counsel drafted the agreement. 
Plaintiff contends that she and her attorney were induced 
to propose this agreement by misrepresentations of the value 
.. of some of the community assets and by the concealment of 
material facts regarding an offer to purchase EI Camino 
Ranch, a 6oo-acre vineyard. 
The trial court found that the agreement was fair and 
equitable, that there were no intentional misrepresentations, 
and that the concealment of the offer for the purchase of EI 
Camino Ranch was not relied upon by plaintiff. In plaintiff's 
view these findings are not supported by the evidence. 
She contends that the evidence clearly proves that she did 
not receive half the community property and that therefore 
the agreement was not fair and equitable. There was otl;.er 
evidence, however, from which the court could infer that 
the agreement was fair and equitable. 
The community property consisted in large part of vine-
yards and other investments in the wine industry. There was 
evidence that the wine industry was depressed at the time 
of the agreement.2 Padre, the family corporation in which 
the community held a half interest, incurred losses of $955,000 
during the five years preceding the negotiations. During the 
fiscal years 1951 and 1952, the two years prior to the negotia-
tions, Padre's losses were $339,494.40 and $196,746.75 re-
spectively. Although its book value was $800,000, the cor-
poration was torn by internal strife between the Vai brothers 
and was losing money at an alarming rate. There was also 
evidence that the community lemon orchards and vineyards 
were all operating at a loss. Moreover, some of the com-
munity securities were pledged for loans from the Bank of 
America. 
Under the agreement plaintiff received all of the properties 
that interested her and that she asked for. She was relieved 
of any liability for the debts of the losing business enterprises 
and obtained many of the stable community assets. Mr. Vai 
received the home, which plaintiff disliked, that he and his 
daughter were occupying, the community securities, a lodge, 
"Wine was selling for $0.35 a gallon at the time of the property agree· 
ment. Plaintiff's witness, a wine broker. testilied that "normally the 
price is eonsiderably higher ... [t)oday the same wines are worth $0.75 
a gallon" and in 1950 the price of the same wines was as high as $0.95 
a gallon. 
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and the assets of speculative value. Plaintiff's agreement ap-
peared advantageous given the possibility that Padre, the 
vineyards and the citrus groves would continue to operate 
.. nt a loss as in the preceding five years. 
Plaintiff and her attorney were aware of this possibility. 
Her attorney advised her several times to demand some of the 
vineyards, but she refused to have anything to do with thosc 
"money losing vineyards." What she wanted was the prop-
erty that would provide for her security. Her attorney testi-
fied: "I went over the list of assets and valuations with her. 
She expressed to me the thought that what she wanted more 
than anything was security. I talked with her about the Alta 
Loma property and she told me that she didn't want Alta 
Loma, that John was happy there, and apparently the daugh-
ter, Madelinl', was happy there, and that she didn't want ally 
part of it. The same was true of Arrowhead. 
"We discussed valuations somewhat in connection with the 
600 acres [EI Camino Ranch]. She didn't express either as-
sent or disapproval of the $200 per acre figure that I had 
brought back to her she wanted the Parkside property and 
she wanted security. 
, , We then discussed what would give her that security and 
what she might expect out of it and I believe at that time we 
discussed taking the Parkside property together with the 
furniture and furnishings, a cash lump settlement payment, 
and support money for a period of limited years. 
"It is my recollection t.hat at that time we discussed the 
sum of $25,000 as being a cash payment in addition to the 
Parkside property plus $5,000 per year for five years, to-
gether with the payment of her expenses to date, and the 
Dodge automobile. In addition, it was still understood that 
Mr. Vai would be required to support the daughter." At 
another point plaintiff's attorney testified: 
"A. Let me put it this way; there were certain assets which 
she could take that she didn't have to gamble on as to thl'ir 
future worth. 
"Q. Those were the assets that you managed to get for her f 
A. That's correct. . .. 
"Q. At the time that you visited Mrs. Vai to sign thl' agrel'-
ment you were well aware of the fact were you not, that Mr. 
Vai was going to get the majority of the assets. A. DoBal' 
wise on the valuation that had lx'en placed on them, yes." 
In evaluating the fairness of the agreement, the court could 
) 
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eonsider that at the time of the settlement plaintiff and Mr. 
Vai were 66 and 71 years old, respectively, that they had a 
common heir, their daughter, and that plaintiff was willing 
to accept less than half the community property if she wel'(, 
given the stable rather than the speculative assets. 
The finding that there was no intentional misrepresentation 
is supported by substantial evidence. Mr. Bodkin, decedent's 
attorney who was present during all of the negotiations, testi-
fied that no representations were made as to the value of 
Padre. There is evidence that plaintiff's attorney had a cur-
rent statement of Padre's position and it is admitted that he 
had a 1950 Dun & Bradstreet report fixing the value of Padre 
at over $1,000,000. Plaintiff and her attorney were told that 
the Padre Company was heavily indebted, had been losing 
money for years, that substantially all the company's assets 
were "in hock," that the company owed money to the Vai 
brothers for back salary and that the company was in danger 
of insolvency. The trial court found that these representa-
tions were true. This finding is supported by evidence that 
Padre owed the Bank of America $480,000, that Padre lost 
over $950,000 during the last five years, that the wine industry 
was seriously depressed, that in 1952 payments of salary to 
John Vai and his brother had been reduced from $3,000 a 
month to $200 a month at the "suggestion" of the Bank of 
America, Padre's principal creditor, that at the time of the 
property agreement the salary payments to the Vai brothers 
were only $500 a month, that the cashier of Padre had written 
cheeks for over $40,000 but was unable to release them to the 
payees because of lack of funds, and by the testimony of a 
Bank of America official that substantially all the assets of 
Padre were "in hock." 
Plaintiff contends that the evidence is undisputed that dur-
ing the negotiations Mr. Vai received an offer to purchase 
EI Camino Ranch for $575,000 and that this offer was in-
tentionally not communicated to plaintiff. The trial court 
found that decedent received such an offer and did not com-
municate it to plaintiff. The court also found, however, that 
there was no intentional concealment of the offer. This find-
ing is supported by the evidence. Mr. Bodkin testified that 
he had no knowledge of the offer, and the court could infer, 
as it did, that Mr. Vai was not aware of his duty to reveal this 
offer. 
Plaintiff contends, however, that even if there were no in-
) 
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tentional misrepresentations of the value of the community 
property alld no intentional concealment of the offer to pur-
chase EI Camino Ranch, the decedent was nevertheless guilty 
of constructive fraud since he owed a fiduciary duty to his 
wife as to the community property under his control and was 
therefore under a duty to state the correct value of all the 
community property and to reveal the offer to purchase EI 
Camino Ranch. Plaintiff contends that the husband is a 
trustee for the wife as to the community property and that 
he must reveal to the wife the true value of all the property 
and correct any misapprehensions that she or her attorney 
may have. 
The fiduciary relationship arising from our community 
property system is not that of a trustee and beneficiary of 
an express trust. A trustee has no interest in the assets of 
the trust and may not assume a position in conflict with the 
interest of the beneficiaries. Each spouse, however, has a 
half interest in the community property and upon division 
of such property the spouses are in a position adverse to each 
other. Moreover, the liability of a husband for management and 
spending of community assets is markedly dissimilar to those 
of a trustee of an express trust. (See Civ. Code, § 172.) 
The fiduciary relationship between spouses arises from the 
confidential relationship between them and from the control 
that one spouse exercises over the community property. When 
a confidential relationship exists the spouses are held to a very 
high degree of fiduciary duty (Burrows v. Burrows, 136 Cal. 
App. 323, 327, 329 [28 P.2d 1072]) and no spouse will be per-
mitted to gain any advantage from the trust and confidence 
placed in him or her by the other. Even when the confidential 
relationship is destroyed by dispute between the spouses, as 
the court found was the case between plaintiff and Mr. Vai, 
the spouse controlling the community property still owes a 
fiduciary duty to the other spouse. This duty, however, is 
analogous to the duty, not of a trustee to a beneficiary. but of 
one partner to another during the dissolution of a part Ilership. 
(Cf. Lynam v. Vorwerk, 13 Cal.App. 507, 509 [110 P. 355].) 
The fiduciary relationship of partners extends to the dis-
.rolution of the partnership (Page v. Page, 55 Cal.2d 192, 
194 [10 Cal Rptr. 643, 359 P.2d 41) ; Laux v. Freed, 53 Cal. 
2<1 512, 522 [348 P.2d 873]). Partners negotiating for the 
division of the partn(>rship assets may nevertheless tak(> posi-
tions consistent with their own int(>rest and in conflict with 
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those of the copartners. A partner is under a duty, however, 
to make all the facts available to any copartner and to disclose 
all facts peculiarly within his own knowledge. (Arnold v. 
AnlOld, 137 Cal. 291, 296 [70 P. 23] ; Reed v. Wood, 190 Okla. 
169 [123 P.2d 275, 278] ; Law v. Law [1905], 1 Ch. 140, 157; 
see Co.lton v. Stanford, 82 Cal. 351,372,380,388 [23 P. 16, 16 
Am.St.Rep. 137] ; Crane, Partnerships, 360; Story, Partner-
ships, 303; 120 A.L.R. 724, 737.) "As to the confidential 
relation of partners, the general rule is, that it exists only as 
to the current business of the partnership, and that when 
they come to contract with each other for a dissolution of 
the partnership they stand at arm's length. It may be con-
ceded that this rule is subject to the qualification that in 
negotiations for a dissolution each partner must deal fairly 
with his copartners, and not conceal from them important 
matters within his own knowledge touching the business and 
property of the partnership." (Arnold v. Arnold, supra, at 
p. 296; accord: Arnold v. Maxwell, 223 Mass. 47 [111 N.E. 
687, 689-690].) 
Likewise in negotiations for a property settlement agree-
ment, each spouse may take a position that favors his or her 
interest and is opposed to the interest of the other spouse. 
The duty owed between spouses in negotiating property settle-
ment agreements has been frequently defined by this court 
and the District Courts of Appeal. (Collins v. Colli11S, 48 
Ca1.2d 325, 331 [309 P.2d 420] ; Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 32 
Cal.2d 13, 22 [193 P.2d 728] ; Estate of Cover, 188 Cal. 133, 
144 [204 P. 583] ; Hellsley v. Hensley, 179 Cal. 284, 287 [183 
P. 445] ; Champion Y. Woods, 79 Cal. 17, 20-21 [21 P. 534, 
12 Am.St.Rep. 126]; Estate of BUzZy, 169 Cal.App.2d 479, 
491-492 [337 P.2d 511] (hearing denied); Cameron v. 
Cameron, 88 Cal.App.2d 585, 593-597 [199 P.2d 443] (hearing 
denied) ; Miga1a v. Dakin, 99 Cal.App. 60, 64 [277 P. 898] 
(hearing denied); Chadwick v. Chadwick, 95 Cal.App. 690, 
700-701 [273 P. 86]; see 1 Armstrong, California Family 
Law, 574, 576; Black, Rescission and Cancellation, § 54.) 
In each of these cases the court held that, after the destruc-
tion of the confidential relationship, spouses negotiatin~ a 
property settlement agreement deal with each other at It arm's 
length," with the exception stated in Jorgensen v. Jorgensen 
that each spouse must reveal information peculiarly within 
his or her own knowledge such as the existence of community 
property. 
) 
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The Collins decision is not based solely upon waiver by the 
wife of the fiduciary duty of the husband. It recognizes that 
after the destruction of the confidential relationship between 
wife and husband the spouses may take positions consistent 
with their oWn interest, unlike the trustee, who has no interest 
in the property that he is administering. We stated in Collins 
that "when the parties to a marriage are negotiating a prop-
erty settlement agreement with recognition that their interests 
are adverse and are dealing at arm's length, neither spouse 
owes to the other the duty of disclosure which he or she would 
owe if their relation remained in fact a confidential one." 
( Collins v. C oUins, 48 Cal.2d 325, 331 [309 P .2d 420].) Like-
wise in Jorgensen v. Jorgensen we stated that although a 
spouse must reveal facts peculiarly within the spouse's knowl-
edge, such as the existence of property, "[a] husband at the 
time of divorce or separation is entitled to take a position 
favorable to his own interest in claiming as his separate prop-
ertyassets that a court might hold to be community property. 
Confronted with the assertion by the husband that certain 
assets are his separate property the wife must take her own 
position and if necessary investigate the facts. " (Jorgensen 
v. Jorgensen, supra, at p. 22; see also Black, Rescission and 
Cancellation, § 54.) When a spouse is given full access to 
the information necessary to negotiate a property agreement, 
an error of judgment by the spouse or her attorney is not 
ground for rescission. (Cameron v. Cameron, supra, 88 Cal. 
App.2d 585, 595.) 
In the present case the trial court's finding that plaintiff 
had access to all of the information except the offer to pur-
chase the El Camino Ranch is supported by the testimony of 
both plaintiff's attorney and decedent's attorney. Plaintiff's 
attorney made substantial investigations of his own. He testi-
fied that he had reports from Dun & Bradstreet stating that 
the net worth of Padre as of 1950 was $1,107,000; he also had 
a Dun & Bradstreet report on Mr. Vai individually; he had 
reports from a private detective and from a title company; 
he had the property he was primarily interested in (Parkside 
Apartments) appraised; he suspended investigation only after 
he had obtained such information as he thought necessary. 
Mr. Bodkin testified that plaintiff's former attorney received 
a current statement of the position of Padre and was urged 
to make appraisals of all the property. He was also given a 
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all of the community assets. Moreover, all books were open to , 
his inspection. Plaintiff was therefore neither actually nor 
constructively defrauded as to the value of the community 
property. 
There was a duty, however, to disclose the offer to purchase 
the EI Camino Ranch. This offer was peculiarly within de- ' 
cedent's own knowledge and the failure to disclose it was a 
breach of duty. (Jorgensen v. Jorge,nsC11, supra, 32 Ca1.2d 
13, 21; see Arnold v. Arnold, supra, 137 Cal. 291, 296; Ree(l 
v. Wood, supra, 190 Okla. 169 [123 P.2d 275, 278] ; Law v. 
Law, supra [1905], 1 Ch. 140, 157; Cran£', Partnerships, 360; 
Story, Partnerships, 303; cf. Civ. Code, § 1573.) If the lack 
of knowledge of the offer affected the dealings of the parties, 
plaintiff would be entitled to rescission or in the court's dis-
cretion to damages resulting from the failure to disclose the 
offer. (See Arnold v. Maxwell, supra, 223 Mass. 47 [111 N.E. 
687,690]; Turner v. Otis, 30 Kan. 1 [1 P. 19, 21] ; 5 Williston, 
Contracts, 4192-4193.) 
The court found, however, that plaintiff failed to prove 
that she would not have entered into the agreement had she 
known of the offer. Under such circumstances a contract can-
not be rescinded. (Colton v. Stanford, supra, 82 Cal. 351, 
399; Oppenheimer v. Clunie, 142 Cal. 313, 318-319 [75 P. 
899] ; Greenawalt v. Rogers, 151 Cal. 630, 635 [91 P. 526].) 
Likewise, damages will be denied to a plaintiff who fails to 
prove that he relied on the misrepresentation. (Hobart v. 
Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal.2d 412, 422, 444-447 [159 P.2d 
958] ; cf. Civ. Code, § 1568.) 
Reliance is an essential element not only of intentional fraud 
but of constructive fraud arising from a breach of fiduciary 
or other duty. (Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., supra [breach 
of duty by officer of a corporation owing fiduciary duty to 
stockholder] ; Colton v. Stanford, supra, 82 Cal. 351, 399-401 
[dealings between business associates owing fiduciary duties 
to each other] ; Hensley v. Hensley, supra, 179 Cal. 284, 287 
[property settlement agreement]; Verdier v. Verdier, 133 
Cal.App.2d 325, 328 [284 P.2d 94] [property settlement agree-
ment] ; Pinney &- Topliff v. Chrysler Corp., 176 F.Supp. 801, 
803.) 
In Hobart v. Hoba1·t Estate Co. we reversed a judgment for 
damages for fraud by a fiduciary because the issue of justifi-
able reliance was taken from the jury by erroneous instruc-
tions of the trial court. Likewise in cases identical with the 
) 
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present ease, this court and the district courts of appeal have 
held that proof of reliance on the alleged misrepresentation 
of a spouse is necessary to rescind a property settlement agree-
ment. (Hensley v. Hensley, supra, 179 Cal. 284, 287; Ver-
dier v. Verdier, 133 Cal.App.2d 325, 328-329 [284 P.2d 94].) 
When an inadvertent omission to disclose facts that there is a 
duty to disclose or an erroneous statement by a fiduciary does 
not influence plaintiff's conduct, rescission of a settlement 
agreement is properly denied. (Civ. Code, §§ 1689, 1567 and 
1568; 1 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, p. 603; Prosser, 
Torts, § 89; Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § 890; Fleming, 
Torts, pp. 656-657; Rest., Contracts, §§ 471c, 476b, 476c; Rest., 
Restitution, § 9b.) 
The court's finding that plaintiff would have entered into 
the contract even had she been informed of the offer to pur-
chase the El Camino Ranch is supported by substantial evi-
dence. Plaintiff's former attorney when asked if, at the time 
he made the property settlement offer, he had sufficient in-· 
formation upon which to base such offer, testified: "Well, I 
felt that I had sufficient information at that time to enable me 
to negotiate a settlement that would be satisfactory to my 
client without further investigation as to the value of the San 
Bernardino County property. I thought that perhaps the 
valuations placed on the land by Mr. Vai might be low in some 
instances, but on the other hand, Mrs. Vai at that time had 
expressed to me a desire that she did not want to participate 
in the Arrowhead, the Alta Loma, or the EI Camino properties 
and therefore under the circumstances I felt that the assets 
and the support which she might acquire under the terms of 
the letter of the 9th would possibly be beneficial to her." 
The attorney further testified that he realized that EI 
Camino Ranch "had a potential future value in excess of 
anything that we had discussed," that he advised plaintiff in 
attempt to secure a part of the vineyard lands in San Bernar-
dino County, but that she indicated that she did not want any 
interest in the vineyards, but wanted other assets to com-
pensate for them. 
From the foregoing testimony the court could infer that 
plaintiff would have entered into the agreement even had she 
known of the offer for EI Camino Ranch. This inference is 
particularly rcasonable since the offer to purchase EI Camino 
Ranch provided for only a small down payment and a large 
purchase-moncy trust deed to secure the remainder of the pur-
56 C.2d-I2 
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chasc price. Such a transaction entailed a considerable risk 
that the price of the land would not be paid if the vineyards 
continued to be unprofitable. The testimony of plaintiff's 
attorney indicated that plaintiff was not interested in taking 
. such risks and that she wanted the stable community property 
assets even at the expense of securing considerably less than 
. half the community property. Moreover, the offer to purchase 
the ranch was for the fair market value of the property. Such 
offer therefore neither enlarged nor diminished the value of 
the community property. 
Plaintiff contends that even if she is not entitled to relief 
under the ordinary rules regulating property settlement agree-
ments between spouses her husband nevertheless assumed 
special duties toward her. Previous to the property settle-
ment agreement plaintiff attempted to take her husband's 
deposition. Mr. Vai, however, was ill and unable to give the 
lleposition. His attorney therefore suggested that the deposi-
1 ion be postponed and promised to supply all information re-
quested by plaintiff. 
The evidence supports the trial court's finding that Mr. Vai 
was ill at the time the deposition was to be taken and that he 
supplied all the information requested. There was no further 
request for a deposition. Plaintiff's attorney indicated that 
he had obtaUied all the information he required. The promise 
to supply all the information requested without formal deposi-
tions did not place decedent in any special position of trust. 
Moreover, the trial court found that plaintiff did not in fact 
place confidence in her husband but independently investi-
gated the facts in which she was interested. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
R.espondents' petition for a rehearing was denied August 
23, 1961. Fourt, J. pro tem.,· participated in place of Mc-
Comb, J., who deemed himself disqualified. Traynor, J., and 
Schauer, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be 
granted. 
*AB8igned by Chairman of Judicial COUIlCil. 
